It's been nearly five years since the recession of 2007-2009 ended. By all accounts, this very severe recession was followed by an extremely disappointing recovery. Economic growth during the recovery has been far too slow to raise the employment-to-population ratio from the low levels to which it fell during the recession, or to close materially the gap between real GDP and potential GDP, in marked contrast to the rapid recovery from the previous severe recession in the early 1980s or from earlier severe recessions in U.S. history. When you include both the periods of the recession and the slow recovery, economic instability has more than tripled according to a common measure of performance used by macroeconomists: The standard deviation of the percentage gap between real GDP and potential GDP rose from 1½ percent during 1984 -2006 to 5½ percent during 2007 (Taylor, 2013 . In this paper I consider the role of economic policy in this poor economic performance.
giving a rationale to "throw out the rule book" and do unusual things. Thus the shift in policy which began about 10 years ago largely continued, and it has now also become a likely cause of the slow recovery.
A. Monetary policy
According to empirical research I conducted before the panic, a significant shift in monetary policy started during the years from 2003 to 2005 when the Federal Reserve held interest rates unusually low compared to the policy of the previous two decades. There are many ways to see this deviation. The federal funds rate was well below the recommendations of the Taylor rule, which described monetary policy well in the 1980s and 1990s. Interest rates were also very low according to vector auto-regression equations estimated with data from the 1980s and 1990s, as shown by Jarocinski and Smets (2008) . Or you can simply compare the interest rate decisions at different points in time. For example, the federal funds rate was 1% in 2003 when the inflation rate was about 2%, and the economy was operating pretty close to normal.
Compare that policy action with the type of monetary policy the Fed used in the 1990s, which it had been following consistently since the early 1980s. In 1997, for example, the federal funds rate was 5.5% when the inflation rate was 2%, with the economy again near normal operating levels. Clearly the 2003 policy represented a shift to a much different policy compared with the 1980s and 1990s. The Fed's federal funds rate was below the inflation rate, completely unlike the policy in the previous two decades.
So there was an explicit discretionary deviation from the Fed's monetary policy reaction function, which the Fed rationalized in part by its deflationary concerns. However, based on economic theories from time inconsistency to the Lucas critique, as well as on historical experiences from the 1970s to the 1990s, such a deviation from rules-based policy would be expected to have adverse consequences.
In fact, empirical research shows it exacerbated the housing boom, encouraged risk taking, and eventually led to the housing bust, defaults and the rise in toxic assets on the balance sheets of many financial institutions. The demand for housing depends in part on rates on longterm fixed rate mortgages which can be held down by low short term interest rate and their expectation. But even if the effect on long rates is small, short rates have direct effects on the demand for housing in part because low interest rates make low teaser rates on adjustable rate mortgages (ARM) possible; it was not a coincidence that ARM originations more than doubled during this period. As demand for homes skyrocketed, housing price inflation jumped from around 7% per year from 2002-03 to nearly 14 % per year in 2004-05 before plummeting in 2006-07. Bordo and Landon Lane (2013) found effects of such policies on housing over a longer span of U.S. history, and similar effects have been found in other countries: Ahrend (2010) showed that the European Central Bank chose an interest rate which was too low for Greece, Ireland, and Spain, causing the excesses in the housing markets in those countries. While housing price inflation was most severe, overall U.S. inflation was also rising during these years with the inflation rate for the GDP price index doubling from 1.7% to 3.4% per year. The low interest rate policy also led to excessive risk taking, as empirical research by Bekaert, Hoerova and Lo Duca (2013) 
B. Regulatory Policy and the Bailouts
There were also shifts in regulatory policy in the years preceding the crisis. While there were hundreds of regulators and supervisors from the New York Fed on the premises of the large 5 financial institutions, they evidently allowed these institutions to deviate from existing safety and soundness rules and thereby take on excessive risks. The main problem was not insufficient regulations, but a failure to enforce existing regulations.
The regulators of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac clearly allowed these institutions to go well beyond prudent risk and capital levels, as documented by Morgenson and Rosner (2011) , who attribute the problem to regulatory capture. Moreover, federal regulatory policy forced private sector lenders to make risky investments through affordable-housing requirements as described by Wallison (2011) would also be bailed. With no framework other than an implicit support for a rescue of creditors, it was a big surprise when they were not bailed out.
The policy uncertainty continued as the TARP was rolled out and then radically altered after it was passed into law. From the time that the TARP was announced on September 19, 2008 6 until a new TARP was put in place on October 13, equity prices plummeted in the US and other countries. The S&P 500 was higher on September 19-following a week of trading after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy-than it was on September 12, the Friday before the bankruptcy, an indication that policy actions taken after September 19 worsened the problem. Indeed, the stock market crash started at the time TARP was being rolled out, perhaps reflecting the inadequacy of a three-page request for legislation, its initial rejection, and the flawed nature of the original plan to buy toxic assets. Act is also increasing regulations which may already have impacted the pace of the recovery.
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C. The Return of Discretionary Fiscal Policy
Fiscal policy also moved in a more discretionary direction during this period as I have researched and written about elsewhere (Taylor (2009 (Taylor ( , 2011 ). In the stimulus package passed in early 2008, for example, temporary payments were sent to individuals which increased aggregate personal disposable income, but did little to jump-start aggregate consumption, much as would be expected from the permanent income or life cycle models.
Many more discretionary fiscal policy actions were taken following the crisis. There was the large stimulus package in 2009 which also did little to stimulate aggregate consumption or government purchases, and thereby real GDP regardless of the size of the multiplier, as shown by Cogan et al (2010) and Cogan and Taylor (2012) . Some argue that a larger or better designed stimulus package would have worked better, but experience from stimulus packages in the 1970s raises doubts about the feasibility in practice. Another example is the Cash for Clunkers program of 2009. It was supposed to jumpstart the economy and help increase and sustain economic growth. There was a small temporary effect on consumption, but it diminished quickly and was offset by declines a few months later as shown by Mian and Sufi (2012). It's hard to see how such a policy could work to get the economy to recover at a faster pace.
While the Cash for Clunkers was small compared to the other fiscal stimulus packages in the past few years, it exemplifies a common problem with all temporary fiscal actions. At best they provide a short term boost to the economy without promoting a faster-growing sustainable recovery. And when they end, they leave the economy with more debt and with the recovery growing at least as slowly as it was before they were enacted. Without some offsetting fiscal consolidation the growing debt itself becomes a drag on the economy. To the extent that the two year payroll tax holiday of 2011 and 2012 boosted the economy, it too had this same transitory 8 effect. Such short term policies also take policymakers' eyes off the enactment of ever important long run growth policies, such as tax and entitlement reform.
II. Alternative Views
While there is considerable evidence that our economic troubles in recent years have been associated with, and indeed caused by, a shift in economic policy, there are alternative explanations for the poor economic performance.
A. Secular Decline in the Equilibrium Real Interest Rate
One explanation-recently outlined by Summers (2013) and sometimes dubbed the secular stagnation hypothesis-holds that the equilibrium real interest rate has declined below zero, perhaps to negative 2% or negative 3%. The decline is supposed to have occurred around ten years ago due to an increase in desired saving and a lack of investment opportunities. The low equilibrium rate remains today and is likely to remain into the future.
The low equilibrium rate means that firms require a very low actual real interest rate, perhaps below negative 2 or 3 percent, in order to have the incentive to invest. However, short term interest rates are already at the zero lower bound and with expected inflation also low, real interest rates cannot be reduced enough to stimulate investment. As a result the economy stagnates. The Fed's only possible policy responses are such actions as quantitative easing and forward guidance, or promises to hold short term interest rates at zero long into the future. These unconventional monetary policies create distortions and harmful side effects, much as in thediscussion of monetary policy above, but the ultimate cause is the secular decline in the equilibrium interest rate rather than policy itself.
One problem with this explanation is that there should have been a lack of demand and high unemployment in the years from 2003-05 even with the very low interest rates and lax regulatory policy. But instead the economy boomed. The unemployment rate got to 4.4%, 9 residential investment demand sky-rocketed, housing price inflation jumped, and overall inflation was rising as described above.
Another problem with the secular stagnation view is that the assumption of an excess of desired saving appears to be inconsistent with the facts. In my 2008 paper on the crisis, I
reported evidence that global saving rates were low, not high. According to the IMF, saving rates had fallen going into the crisis and the U.S. was running a current account deficit which means national saving was below investment.
B. The Weak-Recoveries-Follow-Deep-Recessions Hypothesis
Another widely discussed view is that the recovery has been weak because the recession and the financial crisis were severe. This alternative view is based in part on the book by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) which examined financial crises in many countries over many years.
But there are also a number of problems with this view, at least if one defines recovery in the conventional sense as the period following the trough of a recession. Bordo and Haubrich (2012) and Papell and Prodan (2012) found that the hypothesis does not hold when you look at American history. There were eight recoveries in U.S recorded business cycle history that followed recessions associated with financial crises. These were recoveries from the recessions that started in 1882, 1893, 1907, 1913, 1929, 1973, 1981, and 1990 . The average growth rate in the 8 quarters starting with the trough of the previous recession averaged about 6 percent per year in these recoveries. The growth rate over a comparable period in the current recovery is 
III. Concluding Remarks
The explanation for the great recession and the delayed recovery laid out here fits the facts well. There is a clear empirical association between the poor economic performance in the past ten years and the shift in economic policy toward more discretion, more intervention, and away from predictable rule-like decision making. Macroeconomic theory that stresses the importance of time consistency, the Lucas critique, the predictability of policy, and the benefits of certain simple rules predicts that such a shift in policy would result in poorer performance. So does historical experience from the 1970s to the 1990s in the United States and other countries.
So does empirical research showing that in a number of cases specific policy actions, such as holding rates too low for too long, had adverse consequences. Moreover, the "policy is the problem" view stands up well compared to views that there is a secular stagnation due to a new negative equilibrium real interest rate or that weak recoveries normally follow deep recessions.
But the very existence of alternative economic views implies that more empirical and theoretical research is needed. The stakes are high. If the "policy is the problem" view proves to be correct, then restoring strong sustainable growth will requires changing policy to what has been shown to work in the past: a more predictable rules-based monetary policy, a less interventionist regulatory policy, a long-term reform-oriented fiscal policy, and a strong aversion to bailouts.
